IS IT WRONG TO PLAY VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES?

I.Introduction.

Recent developments have increased many people's concerns about violent
computer games.With the surge in sales of affordable home computers that
haveincreasing amounts of processing power and improved graphic performance,
a rapidly increasing number of people are playing computer games.Over half
of U.S. homes now have personal computers, and that number is rapidly
rising.[1]Computer game sales and sales of video game consoles like the Sony
Playstation and Dreamcast have skyrocketed.Along with this rapid increase in
the number of people playing games there have been improvements in the
graphic quality, sophistication, and creativity of the games themselves.

One segment of the game market has always been devoted to violent games in
which the player pits him or herself in battle against other players,
monsters, or characters.Enabled by rapidly improving technology, the game
makers have made some of these games increasingly graphic in their
portrayals of torture, assault, murder, and other acts of violence.Whereas
shooting an opponent from a distance would have once resulted only in the
collapse of his or her body, now the shot is accompanied by screams of pain,
realistic writhing, blood, specific damage to a part of the body, flying
body parts, and death.Players are equipped with mines, grenades, plasma
guns, machine guns, rail guns, sniper rifles, flame throwers, energy
weapons, and so on to accomplish these ends, with each weapon inflicting its
own characteristic kind of graphic damage.Players have clamored for faster
paced games and more powerful weapons, so that not only have the kills
gotten more graphic but there are more of them as well.

With the increase in the number of people playing these games and
thegraphicness ofportrayals of violence, it is not surprising then that some
people have expressed concerns that there is perhaps something morally
objectionable about playing violent video games.They reason that the
exposure to so much simulated violence and death desensitizes the player to
real violence and death.And the player's exposure to and perpetration of
simulated violence will make it easier in the end for those people to commit
real violence.Violent video games are frequently mentioned, sometimes in the
same breath, with news reports or discussions about mass murders,
particularly those committed by high school students.It is not difficult to
feel some sympathy with the critics' point.It is hard to imagine how a
person can frequently participate in brutal, graphic, and realistic acts of
simulated violence and not be affected in some morally relevant
sense.Studies of children have shown that they are less likely to seek adult
help concerning real-life violence and they will witness a higher level of
real-life violence after viewing violence on television.[2]Among adults,
physiological responses to real violence are reduced after viewing violent
television.[3]So it is hard to imagine that there would be no adverse
effects to playing games where one is not merely passively observing
violence committed by others, but the player is actually pulling the
joystick trigger and inflicting simulated harm themselves.Common sense
dictates that playing such games makes committing real violence easier,
however slightly.And common sense also dictates that aside from the harm a
person might do to others, playing violent computer games of this sort must
have a negative effect on his or her moral character.

On the other side of the debate, one might argue that merely playing a game,
however realistic, is not morally objectionable simply because it is
fake.Real humans are what matter in the moral assessment of one's actions;
real harm happens between real people and in video games there are
neither.Acting like you are hurting someone is not actually hurting
someone.Simulating an act that is morally objectionable is not itself
morally objectionable, or else we would have to conclude that an actor in a
play or movie playing the part of Hitler or a serial killer is himself doing
something morally objectionable.

So the questions before us a is participating in simulated violence even
where there is no victim itself somehow morally objectionable?Is there
anything wrong with going through the motions of an immoral act, and if so
what is it?

The best answer to these questions requires that we consider the
contribution ofall three of the major moral theories--utilitarianism,
deontological ethics, and virtue ethics.Each theory sheds some light on what
might be wrong with such activities and they help to clarify the issues
involved significantly.By sketching out the theoretical approach available
to each position it becomes clear whose interests are relevant, what kinds
of harm there might be, and what morally salient features of the problem we
should focus on.I will argue that neither the utilitarian, nor the Kantian
can produce compelling reasons to object to authentic simulations of
violence or immoral activity.Nor can they capture our common sense moral
intuitions about the matter.One important result of the utilitarian and
Kantian analyses is that it becomes clear that whatever might be wrong with
playing violent video games, or more broadly, participating in simulated
immoral acts, it has nothing to do with the impact of people other than the
player.But Aristotle's account of moral character, which focuses on the
development of virtue through one's actions, gives a natural and intuitive
explanation of why these activities seem morally objectionable.



II.The Utilitarian Response to Violent Video Games

The most common kind of objection to violent video games seems to have
utilitarian or consequentialist grounds.When people shake their heads upon
hearing the news about the most recent high school shooting rampage and
mention the unfortunate influence of violent video games, their objection is
that the video games have contributed to the conditions that produced this
tragic outcome.That is, many people believe that violent video games make it
more likely, even if only by a small amount, that people will commit harmful
acts against others.Let us explore the relationship between simulated acts
and real acts further.

First, to understand how simulated acts might affect us, we can make this
threefold distinction:A dangerous act is an act that increases the risk of
harm to either the person who engages in the act or someone else who is
endangered by the actor.So not surprisingly, when someone goes skydiving,
she engages in a dangerous act (at least it is more dangerous than many
other activities.)And when someone drives recklessly on a winding, two lane
road at night, that person puts themselves at danger and anyone else in the
car or in the oncoming lane.

Let us define a harmful act as an act that inflicts some damage on someone,
the actor or someone else.Harmful acts may or may not arise from dangerous
acts.Playing Russian roulette is a dangerous act, and if the chamber with
the bullet aligns with the hammer, it becomes a harmful act as well.Eating a
hamburger is not a particularly dangerous act, but if one chokes on it, the
act becomes a harmful one.

Risk increasing acts are acts that make a person more likely to commit a
dangerous or harmful act.A person who has three martinis at a party and gets
in their car and drives home puts others on the road at risk of harm.Getting
mildly drunk itself is not particularly dangerous, provided that one does
not drink enormous amounts and that the health risks of doing it only rarely
are negligible, nor does the act of getting drunk itself directly endanger
others.But getting drunk does make it more likely that when you do other
things, harm or danger will result.In fact, even having a single glass of
wine at dinner is an act that increases the risk, if only slightly, that one
will do harm to someone else.

Now we are in a better position to analyze violent video games and simulated
immoral acts from the utilitarian perspective.It should be clear that under
normal circumstances, playing a violent video game is not itself a dangerous
act.That is, with a few exceptions, the gamer undertakes no more risks by
sitting in front of the television or the computer screen than a non-gamer
would.

Playing violent video games themselves are not harmful either, as far as we
know.While it could turn out that the sort of arousal of playing games or
some other fact about them is discovered to cause harm to humans, we do not
have any compelling evidence that playing the games itself is more harmful
than watching television or operating a computer.

The worry or complaint that many people have about participating in
authentic simulations of immoral acts, or playing violent video games, is
that doing so is a risk increasing act.To say that violent video games play
a causal role in some real acts of violence is to say at least that by
playing them a person increases the likelihood that they will commit
violence or do harm to themselves or others.And while not all risk
increasing acts are morally objectionable (driving a car, we are told,
increases one's risks more than flying in a plane), some of them, either
because they increase the risks (particularly to others) so much, or because
the benefits gained by the addition of risk are outweighed, ought to be
avoided.

According to Utilitarian theories of ethics, an act is good insofar as it
promotes benefit to people overall and it is bad to the extent that it
causes harm to people overall.So with the above distinctions in mind, the
utilitarian might be able to argue that violent video games are morally
objectionable because playing them is unacceptably risk increasing.What can
the utilitarian say about anticipated bad consequences in a case like
this?Rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism give different answers.The
ruleutilitarian need not wait for the results of an act in order to make
some determination about its moral status.If it can be established with
reasonable certainty that an act of a certain type increases the risk of
harm on the whole, even if not every act of that sort actually results in
harm, and that risk is not outweighed by overall benefits, then the
utilitarian can be critical of that act to an extent that is proportional to
the amount of risk increase.So to keep the cases simple, the utilitarian can
condemn a game of Russian roulette, even if the players manage to play
without getting the chamber with the bullet.

The act utilitarian has some more latitude in determining whether or not
individual acts are morally objectionable.Whereas the rule utilitarian might
have decided that generally speaking acts of a certain type rarely generate
enough overall benefit to make them acceptable, the act utilitarian may take
individual variations in the situation into account that might make an
isolated act acceptable while many others similar to it are not.

Merely increasing the risk of harm cannot be the utilitarian's only
consideration, however.If playing the games is a risk increasing act, then
it may also turn out that on the whole, they cause more harm to people than
benefit.If empirical studies of game playing reveal that players are more
likely to do harm to others as a result of playing games, there might be
utilitarian grounds on which to object to them.I say "might" because it is
not enough to point out that an act is risk increasing to show that it is
morally objectionable on a utilitarian account.The act has to cause (or risk
causing) more harm than benefit overall.There is the additional complication
of uncertainty regarding outcomes.The possibility of danger or harm
resulting must be weighed against the likelihood of benefit that will
result.A small increase of risk may be worth a substantial increase in
certain benefit, but a huge increase in risk may not be worth an unlikely
beneficial result.If someone unnecessarily undertakes a risk increasing act
with no overall benefit to be gained, or the benefits to be gained do not
outweigh the costs, or if the benefits are too unlikely to justify the
increase in risk, then the utilitarian has grounds on which to condemn that
act as immoral.For example, there is some risk associated with undergoing
surgery due to complications, mistakes, infection, and so on, but if the
likelihood that one's life will be saved by the surgery far outweighs the
likelihood that one of these unfortunate outcomes will result, then the
surgery is a risk increasing act that is not morally objectionable.

Suppose then that the often alleged empirical claim that playing violent
video games increases the likelihood that players will commit harm to others
is true.Note that the public debate about violent movies, television, and
video games has focused largely around this issue.But showing that risk is
increased by an activity is a far cry from showing that the activity is
morally objectionable.Our lives are filled with risk increasing acts that we
regularly accept because of the greater benefits to be derived from
them.Driving to the grocery store is more risky, than staying at home, but
we consider the advantages of having groceries substantial enough to justify
it.So if it is true that violent movies, television, and video games are
risk increasing acts, the defenders of television, movies, and game have not
lost the debate (at least from the utilitarian perspective).Risk increase is
just one factor that goes into the calculation of overall benefit or harm.If
the advantages overall still justify that increase in risk, the activities
can be defended on utilitarian grounds.

So what does the utilitarian need to support the stronger claim that playing
the games is morally objectionable.The utilitarian needs to demonstrate that
the increased risk of harm resulting from playing the games outweighs the
benefits and the likelihood of benefits derived from playing them.Attempts
to clearly articulate all of the relevant factors in such a cost/benefit
analysis are notoriously difficult, but we can raise a few decisive
considerations.There are millions of people playing violent video games with
the numbers growing every year.These people are playing the games for a
reason.One of the first things players will point out in these discussions
is that the games are fun.The recreational and entertainment value of
playing is very high to players.Furthermore, the money that the players
spend on the games and on computer equipment is helping to fuel a huge
expansion in technology that has and will continue to have a variety of
other benefits.Airlines, police departments, and the military are all using
video game technology to train and become proficient at tasks that are too
risky to practice otherwise.(Of course, someone might well argue that
military proficiency derived from video game technology should be considered
a cost rather than a benefit given its results.)

The video game player might even respond that these justifications for the
value of the games are not needed.Consider the high risks associated with
playing football, a sport that is clearly much more popular and much more
harmful, dangerous, and risk increasing than video games.Injury and even
death results from playing football on the professional, amateur,
collegiate, and recreational level on a surprisingly regular.These risks are
gladly accepted by the players (and the fans) in exchange for what is to be
gained by playing.But the players are not the only ones at risk.Emergency
room admissions for battered wives and girlfriends increase significantly on
Super Bowl Sunday.Riots, fights, assaults, and other violence between fans
have become so common place in football stadiums that San Francisco Giants
games require over 150 police to maintain order.British soccer matches, to
point out another example, are notorious for erupting into huge riots
between fans that result in hundreds of injuries and deaths.On June 19, 2000
after the Lakers beat the Indiana Pacers in an NBA finals game, hundreds of
Laker fans became violent, smashed windows, burned cars, destroyed
stores.Rioters destroyed property in 35 different locations.Stuart Fischoff,
a professor of media psychology at California State University, Los Angeles
said, "It's the level of arousal that is the key factor.Everyone gets caught
up in the maelstrom." [4] Notice that these incidents are quite common.They
happen every year surrounding our sporting events.But the possibility that
there is something morally objectionable about football, soccer, or
basketball is hardly considered.Typically the response to prevent the
violence is to increase security and try to deter people from acting on the
impulses that are stimulated by the sports events.

It should be clear that the harm, danger, and risk associated with playing
these other sports vastly exceed the risks that may turn out to be
associated with playing violent video games.No video game player ever broke
her neck playing Quake III, fractured a leg when Laura Croft jumped off a
large building, or ended up in a wheel chair after a virtual high speed car
wreck.Nor is any spectator, watching a video game player from the couch in
front of the television, in danger of being crushed in riot, beaten up by
fans of the opposing side, or victimized by looting and fires.While children
may get in a fight over who gets to play the Nintendo game next, neither
they nor anyone who is watching their game faces the risk, harm, or danger
associated with many sporting events.

Now we are in a position to summarize the utilitarian's approach to the
violent video game issue.It does not appear that the utilitarian can or will
have any substantial grounds on which to morally criticize playing violent
video games.They are faced by two substantial hurdles.First, the utilitarian
needs to demonstrate that violent video games are risk increasing
activities.Carefully controlled empirical studies can identify the causal
link, if there is one, between playing the games and doing harm to oneself
or others.These studies should also reveal important facts about how much
playing is connected with how much harm or tendency to do harm.Second, if
utilitarians wish to argue that violent video games are morally
objectionable with the results of these studies in hand, they need to argue
that the overall increased likelihood to do harm outweighs the benefits
derived from the activity.And it is this second hurdle that I believe the
utilitarian will have the most trouble getting over.In general, our
society's threshold for acceptable risk is very high for recreational
activities.With little more justification than fun or entertainment, we
skydive, hang glide, scuba dive, rock climb, play football, back pack,
bungee jump, and so on, despite the fact that there are rather substantial
risks of harm to oneself and others associated with these activities.At the
very least, gamers are having a great deal of fun playing violent games, so
the utilitarians who would object to them will have to rethink their
attitude towards many of our risky activities, or argue that violent video
games are significantly different in kind.Empirical studies of the issue may
prove me wrong, but I have strong doubts that the critic of violent video
games will succeed in surmounting this second hurdle.

So far, the sort of utilitarian analysis we have considered has been a
fairly straight-forward cost, benefit, and risk assessment.The view we have
considered is rather like Jeremy Bentham's that pains and pleasures, with
some calculating and translating, can be compared and summed directly.But it
should be pointed out that the utilitarian position and their objection to
violent video games may not be as simple as this.John Stuart Mill is famous
for diverging from Bentham on just this point about the comparison of
pleasures.According to Mill, there are different, higher and lower,
capacities for pleasure and pain, and that there are some higher pleasures
and capacities that are more valuable than the lower ones.Mill's distinction
between higher and lower pleasures gives the utilitarian another possible
objection to violent video games.According to Mill, the ability to
experience pleasure and pain is commensurate with the sophistication level
of one's mind and the kind of capacities one possesses.So a human's pleasure
and pain are not the same as those of a fish.Furthermore, these capacities
in humans can be lost or refined and developed, depending upon the sort of
treatment a person gets.As a result, Mill remarks that the,

"capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant,
easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of
sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if
the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the
society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that
higher capacity in exercise."[5]

We can anticipate, therefore, that the utilitarian might take up Mill's
distinction and argue that video games, because the wanton destruction,
lawlessness, and violence appeal to our lesser, base impulses, could cause a
person's capacities for higher pleasures and goods to atrophy.But this
objection is weakened by the rejoinder we considered earlier.At best, this
sort of objection is arguing for moderation, balance, and an equal
development of human talents.If we take it as a blanket condemnation of the
so-called lesser pleasures, video games are just one of a long list of
activities that we will be forced to avoid.And as we said before, a
plausible moral theory should accommodate activities like sports, games, and
recreation to a reasonable extent.



III.The Kantian's Response to Violent Video Games

What about deontological or Kantian theories of ethics?Can they produce
plausible reasons for arguing that playing violent video games is morally
objectionable?

Deontological theories of ethics judge the rightness of wrongness of acts
according to their conformity with duty.Kant gives two characterizations of
duty that are relevant to this discussion.The first formulation of Kant's
categorical imperative is that you should, "Act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never
as a means only." [6]Kant also expresses the highest statement of our moral
duty in terms of universality: "act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."[7]

The problem with violence against people is easily identifiable with
reference to the first statement of the Categorical Imperative.If a person
commits unjustified violence against another person, she is failing to treat
that person as an end in herself.If we disregard their value as rational and
autonomous agents, then we treat them as mere means to an end.And committing
violence against someone is possibly the worst way to reduce them to a mere
object or means status.

Can the Kantian argue that by playing violent video games we treat people as
mere means to an end, thus violating this version of the Categorical
Imperative?To answer the question, it should be noted that there are video
games that involve other people and there are games that do not.In some
video games a player pits herself against automated opponents.The game is
programmed to provide monsters, characters, or opponents that the player
fights or competes against.In these cases, the person who plays is not
treating any other people as mere means to an end because there are no other
people involved.We will address the possibility of mistreating other
non-players as a result of playing against the programming shortly.

A rapidly increasing portion of the video game market is for games that
allow play between people.Console games that attach to a television set and
allow multiple people to play, or computer games that network different
players over the Internet, pit people against people.So there is the
potential for violations of one's moral duty to other people as ends in
themselves in these cases.What sort of behavior in these games would
constitute a violation of one's duty to others?The example of other types of
games we play sheds some light on the Kantian case as it did with
utilitarianism.The Kantian argument gives us a way to identify a phenomena
that we are all familiar with, the person who is a "bad sport."

A person who wins a game is a "bad sport" when she gloats, or demeans or
insults her opponents, or when she is otherwise disrespectful.A person who
loses a fair game is a bad sport when she is resentful of the winners for
the loss, angry or bitter at the winners, reluctant to give due credit or
respect to the winners, or is otherwise demeaning.

The version of the categorical imperative under consideration gives us a
convenient way to identify what is wrong with being a bad sport.The extent
to which we fail to respect others, whether in a game or not, as autonomous
persons like ourselves who are striving to achieve their goals is the extent
to which we violate the categorical imperative.Part of Kant's point in the
categorical imperative is to emphasize that being moral is about recognizing
that other people are like you, and that we should remember to put ourselves
in "their shoes" in our interactions with them.The bad sport is too
self-focused, wallowing in self-pity over a loss, or gloating in arrogance
over a win, to the exclusion of considerations about the opponent's
perspective.Being a bad sport is wrong for Kant because it is being
disrespectful of one's opponents as ends in themselves.

When we play violent video games with other people, we cannot do any real
physical harm to them, despite the heavy plasma blaster firepower we might
bring down on their game character.But we can be bad sports towards them.We
can demean them with our actions, we can be disrespectful of their humanity,
and we can treat them as mere means to our own selfish ends (winning).And
while being a bad sport is not a very serious moral crime for Kant (it is
not murder, after all), he would say that one should strive to be a good
sport.When you are a bad sport, you treat your opponent as a mere object and
you cease to see them as persons or as an end in themselves.The problem here
is not confined to playing violent video games.We can be a bad sport over
cards, football, arm wrestling, dominoes, and so on.

Do violent video games deserve special consideration on these
grounds?Playing video games over the Internet does have a peculiar
problem.As anyone who has sent or been the recipient of a hostile, rude, or
demeaning email, the faceless anonymity of the Internet makes it easier to
disrespect people's value as humans.We are all prone to say or do things to
people over the Internet that we would never consider saying or doing to
them in person.It is not uncommon for violent video game players on the
Internet to exchange demeaning, insulting, and disrespectful comments to
each other.And all too often, these comments have a nasty sexist or
anti-homosexual ring to them, making the connotations even uglier.Blasting
someone into bloody pieces with a rocket launcher and then typing, "Die,
bitch!!" or "Down on your knees, cocksucker!" is troubling to the Kantian on
several levels, and for good reason.

The general connections between violence and many of our games deserves
comment from Kantian grounds.While violent video games make a game out of
simulated acts of violence, connecting violence with playing a game is not
unique to them.Many of the games that humans play make sport of doing
harm.We fence, do martial arts, wrestle, play paint ball and laser tag,and
have boxing matches.The language of warfare and violence permeates our
descriptions of football, rugby, and even chess.We conquer the opponent,
crush their defense, invade their territory, cripple them, smash them, and
kill them.What does the Kantian, who condemns violence as treating people as
mere means, have to say about these violent aspects of the games we play?It
would be unreasonable for a moral theory to condemn game playing outright on
these grounds, and uncharitable to read Kant as doing so.At the very least,
we should accept this recommendation from Kant that should not be confined
to violent video gameseople are valuable, and their rights and autonomy
ought to be respected.We should take special care in our activities,
including our recreation, to esteem their personhood.

Utilitarian, we have seen, are not just concerned with acts that are
directly harmful, but also with acts that increase the risk of harm or
danger.There are some parallel concerns for the Kantian who is not only
worried about direct violations of one's duty, but also acts that increase
the risk that one will violate one's duties.In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant
raises just such a concern about our treatment of animals.As far as animals
are concerned, he says, "we have no direct duties"[8] because they are not
self-conscious and they are merely means to an end.But it does not follow
that any treatment of them is acceptable; we still have an indirect duty to
other humans through the animals.Kant recognizes that the right kinds of
behavior and the disposition to do one's duty must be cultivated.We are to
be kind and not to mistreat animals because a failure to do so would make us
more likely to violate our duty to humans.He says, "tender feelings towards
dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind."[9]Cruelty, if allowed
in our lives will grow and worsen, whether it be directed at animals or
humans.So we must be vigilant against it.

We can see the application of similar reasoning to the violent video game
case for Kant.We have an indirect duty to animals because our dealings with
them puts us at greater risk for directly violating our duty to humans.The
Kantian might well argue that since it is people we are playing the games
against, we are increasing our risk of violating our duty to
them.Cultivating cruelty and indifference with regard to virtual suffering
and death encourages the same towards real suffering and death, we can
imagine Kant saying.

Despite the plausibility of Kant's analysis here, we should consider a
difficulty.In the case of animals, Kant has taken it as obvious that cruelty
to animals will spill over onto our treatment of humans.Indeed, he treats it
as a widely known fact, noting that in England, "butchers and doctors do not
sit on a jury because they are accustomed to the sight of death and
hardened."[10]The video gamer might well respond at this point by arguing
that it is far from obvious that pulling the joystick trigger similarly
makes it easier to pull the real trigger.Playing a game, whether on the
computer or on the rugby field, is not the same as real life.And beating
your opponent, the gamer continues, is different morally and metaphysically
from indulging in real cruelty on real animals.Far from disrespecting and
dehumanizing each other, participants in many of the most violent sports
like boxing, wrestling, and football often have the utmost respect and
admiration for each other and each other's accomplishments.

Now reconsider the cases of risk, danger, and harm in sports that we
considered from the utilitarian perspective.Kant's analysis is not with
costs and benefits simplicitur but with engaging in activities that could
make it more likely that one would violate one's duty.So if you go to a
soccer match and choose to sit in a section of particularly rowdy,
empassioned fans, knowing that you are prone to get overly excited yourself
and you find yourself participating in a riot against the opposing fans, the
Kantian might justifiably object to your going to the game.And if it is
possible for you to engage in the act without diminishing your commitment to
your moral duty, by not going to the game, sitting in a different section,
or staying calm, for example, then the Kantian may be satisfied.

But the argument by analogy from Kant's statement of our indirect duty to
animals to the case of violent video games should not be accepted without
reservation.Whether or not such behavior makes one more likely to violate
one's duties to others is one of the few clearly empirical matters in Kant's
ethics and could be settled with a careful study of what game players and
non-game players are prone to do.But even if it turns out that Kant is right
and engaging in some activities makes it more likely that we will violate
our duties to others, it does not follow that that activity is therefore
wrong.Notice that Kant does not argue that no one should be a butcher or a
surgeon, even though it has a detrimental effect on the performance of their
moral duties.Kant recognizes that some activities have a value that
outweighs their negative side effects.Surgeons are obviously crucial in
society, and Kant allows that the perhaps less vital role of butcher is
morally acceptable (many more people could do their own butchering than
could do their own surgery), as long as we are aware of the problems
associated with the occupation.

So we have a number of questions to ask about the Kantian account.First, do
activities like being cruel to animals or playing violent video games make
it more likely that people will violate their moral duty to others?Second,
if some activities do make duty violations more likely, at what point do the
negative side effects of the activity justify avoiding or morally condemning
the activity?And what I have argued is that playing violent video games will
most likely not result in a person's running afoul of these two
conditions.If we are too sensitive about the detrimental effects of games on
a person's inclination to do her duty, we will be forced to condemn a wide
range of activities along with violent video games that most people find
morally acceptable.And it would be unreasonable to disregard the benefits
that are also derived from many activities that may have a lesser negative
impact as well.Furthermore, it does not appear that the Kantian account can
say anything that isolates participating in simulations of immoral acts from
other activities.What it can offer applies to all game or sport activities
and does not capture our sense that there is something differently wrong
about going through the motions of an immoral act.



IV.The Problem Remains

At this point, the critic of violent video games might still complain that
whatever it is that is morally objectionable about playing them has not been
adequately addressed.We have seen that the utilitarian cannot provide much
support for the belief we may have that there is something wrong about the
games.And the Kantian response seems to reduce to the recommendation that we
should all be good sports when we play games, and that we should all
remember to treat each other with respect and dignity.In both cases, what
the utilitarian or the Kantian response fails to isolate cases of
participating in simulated immoral acts, and their responses are in terms of
its effect or treatment of other people.But we have yet to focus our
attention on what harm might become of the person that is playing the
game.Isn't there something wrong about the activity for the person who is
doing it?

A revised hypothetical example can help to bring out what might be bothering
us about simulated acts of violence.Many people are familiar with the
holodeck on the Star Trek series. On the holodeck an elaborate computer
system is able to holographically simulate any situation forthe occupant to
experience.Holographic projectors, force field generators, and advanced
artificial intelligence programs make a simulation of a beach at sunset or
the east end of 19th century London look, feel, smell, and sound like the
real thing.The only real persons or things in the holodeck are the human
participants.Someone might complain that there are physical and mechanical
constraints that would make building such a device physically impossible.But
for the purposes of our example, it will suffice that such a device is
logically possible.We can see the holodeck is a plausible extension of the
improvements in video game technology that are allowing more and more
realistic participation in the computer games that we currently
see.Indeed,the computer manufacturers are striving to build technology that
would allow the construction of something like a holodeck, and gamers
anxiously await these kinds of technological improvements.

Imagine now that someone runs a program on the holodeck that allows him or
her to commit holo-pedophilia with a simulated holo-child.The sophistication
of the program and the hardware make it possible for the every aspect of the
act to be portrayed in perfectly realistic detail.Similarly, someone could
commit holo-genocide,holo-rape, or holo-murder.In these cases most of us
have a strong moral intuition that there is something morally objectionable
about the act itself, isolated from anything else that might happen outside
the holodeck, and even though it is only simulated and no victim gets
hurt.But the utilitarian does not seem to be able to object to the act
itself without an appeal to some real consequences, perhaps when the person
goes on to commit the act on real persons.And the Kantian cannot complain
that the holodeck pedophile, murderer, or rapist is being a bad sport or is
disrespecting some real persons.The Kantian might make the weaker complaint
that engaging in such an activity would make it more likely that a person
would go on to violate his or her duties to real humans.But for most of us,
what seems wrong with the activity just described is not merely that the
person might go on to do violate a duty to others or do harm to them.What
strikes us about the example is that there seems to be something wrong with
the activity without regard to what might happen outside the holodeck at
some other time.And there is something wrong with the act solely with
respect to the person who commits it.



V.The Aristotelian's Response to Violent Video Games and Holodeck Immorality

An Aristotelian or virtue ethical theory can provide us with the vocabulary
and explanation of what our gut feelings tell us is wrong with
holo-pedophilia, and perhaps by extension, to violent video games.
Aristotelian ethics takes a fundamentally different approach to morality
than the other theories we have addressed.Utilitarianism and Kantianism have
both been more concerned with the performance of acts and their conformity
with rules or principles.The utilitarian wants to know what the overall
consequences will be; the principle of utility is the only yardstick for
morality.The Kantian, is not concerned about the consequences, but she is
concerned about the conformity of an activity with the Categorical
Imperative.Both theories focus their attention on the acts themselves, and
both theories test the acts against a rule of morality.

The Aristotelian takes a broader interest in the character of the person,
rather than the implications of an act for other people or its conformity
with a rule.To borrow Bernard Mayo's phrase, virtue ethics are more
interested in "being" than in "doing."[11] Aristotle believes that the
question of a person's character is more fundamental and more important than
a person's obedience to rules of conduct.Aristotle argues that a deep,
fulfilled happiness (eudaimonia) can only be achieved by pursuing the
development of the capacities that are the unique function of human
beings.Our function, and the traits that set us off from other beings, is
our capacity to reason.So we must exercise our reason and govern our
behavior with reason in order to achieve happiness.

In addition to possessing the capacity to reason, our lives are
characterized by lower functions:we possess inborn desire, we have
sensation, we are capable of movement, we need nourishment, we grow, and we
seek to reproduce. We share some of these traits with plants and some of
these traits with animals.In order for our rational nature to function
properly, it must infuse, direct, and govern these other lower
functions.Aristotle argues that reason will guide us on a moderated path
between extreme behaviors and activities.When reason plays its appropriate
role, we exhibit virtue.Reason guides us to the virtue of courage between
the extremes of cowardice and recklessness.The virtue between the pursuit of
pleasure and the avoidance of pain is temperance.Highmindedness is between
honor and disgrace.

Building a virtuous character does not come easily or quickly, according to
Aristotle.It is not in our nature to be either virtuous or virtueless, he
argues, so we must cultivate these character traits with education and
habit.The way to be a good person, on Aristotle's view, is not simply to do
the right thing as it is in the other theories.Mere outward conformity with
what appears to be the good will not suffice.He says, "the agent must be in
a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have
knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own
sake, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable
character."[12]We can only become a right thinking and subsequently right
behaving person through training.As a result, what particular choice one
makes in a moral situation is not as important in the development of
character as being courageous, being wise, or being temperate.

The Aristotelean has a ready answer to the question, what, if anything, is
wrong with playing violent video games.By participating in simulations of
excessive, indulgent, and wrongful acts, we are cultivating the wrong sort
of character.The Aristotelian would respond that the holo-pedophile, or the
holo-murderer is re-enforcing virtueless habits and dispositions in
themselves.Notice also that the complaint the Aristotelian would make is
different than the utilitarian's.The utilitarian might argue that by
indulging in holo-crimes, one makes it more like that you will commit real
crimes.You lower your inhibitions, desensitize yourself to suffering, and
make it easier to do actual harm to real people.We have seen, however, that
the utilitarian cannot make this criticism of games without also criticizing
a host of other activities like football, fencing, or even chess.But the
Aristotelian does not object to holo-crimes on the basis that the activity
will lead to other real crimes or harm.The Aristotelian is primarily focused
on the character of the person who is participating.By engaging in such
activities, you do harm to yourself in that you erode your virtue, and you
distance yourself from your goal of eudaimonia.

The drawback of the Aristotelian position, however, is that we may find that
it is all to willing to condemn or even ban a long list of activities that
we value highly in the interests of character development.The Aristotelian
may be too ready to condemn or ban books, movies, sports, television
programs on the grounds that they promote the wrong sorts of character.A
great deal of Aristotelian character development could be accomplished at
the price of many human rights that we (and Kant, and the Utilitarians)
would consider invaluable.



VI.Conclusion

We began this study by trying to identify what it is about participating in
authentic, but simulated, immoral acts.Many people have a strong moral
intuition that there is something objectionable about playing a game that
requires and enables a player to inflict harm on representations of other
players.Many of the objections to violent video games have centered around
their alleged contribution to people's committing real violence.But we have
seen that utilitarian arguments of this sort are actually the weakest
objections that the critic can raise.The challenge of showing that playing
violent video games is a causal factor in real violence is substantial, and
the additional challenge of showing that increased risk outweighs all of the
benefits derived from the games will not be met unless our threshold is
lowered to point that it similarly condemns a host of other activities that
we cherish.Kantians, it would appear, cannot offer us a justification for
our suspicions either.They can admonish us to be good sports in our games,
and remind us to value and respect other humans, despite the anonymity of
the Internet.But it is not evident that ear that respecting people's
humanity is made any more difficult by violent video games than it is by a
wide range of sport and game activities that we consider to be morally
acceptable.And even Kant refuses to condemn activities on those grounds
alone.Aristotelianism, however, provides us with a more substantial and
intuitive explanation of what we do wrong when we pull the virtual
trigger.We re-enforce virtueless habits and make it harder for the
individual to reach eudaimonic fulfillment.



Dr. Matt McCormick


Department of Philosophy

California State University

Sacramento, CA

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[1] Jones Thompson, Maryann. "Half of U.S. Homes Now Have PCs ZD InfoBeads
shows another 6.4 million American households acquired PCs in the past
year."The Standard.
http://www.thestandard.com/research/...9,9846,00.html
[2] Drabman, R.S. and Thomas, M.H."Exposure to filmed violence and
children's tolerance of real-life aggression," Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 1.1974: 198-199.
"Does Media violence increase children's toleration of real-life
aggression?" Developmental Psychology. 1974. vol. 10: 418-421.
[3] Thomas, M.H. and Drabman, R.S."Toleration of real life aggression as a
function of exposure to televised violence and age of subject,"
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 21: 227-232.1975.
[4]Sacramento Bee, Wednesday, June 21, 2000
[5] Mill, John Stuart.Utilitarianism in Theories of Ethics, ed. by Paul A.
Newberry. p. 317.Mountain View, Ca." Mayfield Publishing, 1999.
[6]Kant, Immanuel.Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.Trans. Lewis
White Beck.New York:MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987.Akademie 429.
[7]Ibid., Akademie 422.
[8] Kant, Immanuel.Lectures on Ethics.trans. Louis
Infield.Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company, 1963.240.
[9]Ibid.
[10]Ibid.
[11] Mayo, Bernard.Virtue and the Moral Life.New York:Macmillan Ltd.,
1958.Find the page.
[12] Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. trans. W.D. Ross in Theories of Ethics.
ed. Paul A. Newberry. p. 111.Mountain View, Ca.: Mayfield Publishing, 1999.

__________________________________________________ _______


Questions about "Is it Wrong to Play Violent Video Games?"

1. What is the difference between dangerous acts, harmful acts, and risk
increasing acts?


2. According to this article, can the utilitarian show that the harms
outweigh the benefits of playing violent video games?


3. Can the Kantian make a special objection to violent video games that
does not apply to other sports and game activities?


4. What kind of holodeck act is considered in connection with video games?


5. In one sentence, what objection can Aristotle make to participating in
authentic simulations of immoral acts?