On Nov 17, 5:12 pm, "Chess One" wrote:
Bill, in light of our interview, and Taimanov's response, what is your
opinion on all this matter?

I don't have a lot of time now to reply, so I append something I wrote
a few
years ago. It still seems reasonable to me, barring the important
omission
that Keres knew he'd be in big trouble if he played the spoiler and
let Reshevsky win by beating Botvinnik. This added extra pressure
which I'm sure was not good for his play vs Botvinnik (of which more
see below).

I would also add that if I were organizing the conspiracy, I would
split the losses more evenly between Keres and Smyslov. If they both
went -2 that would be plausible and guarantee Botvinnik a win. Even
if it went as it did, I would order
Botvinnik and Keres to draw their third game, for a more plausible
looking result.

I think Smyslov got the same warning as Keres, but his nerves were
always steadier so his play was less affected.



[...]


The soviets were no fools. If they insisted that the
WC be thrown, a mere +2 for Keres vs Botvinnik would have
been sufficient, and in view of 1940 fairly unsurprising.
Two wins for Botvinnik and three draws would have surprised
nobody and given that each player would in effect have five
extra rest days would give them the energy to really go
after Reshevsky. Throw in a guaranteed +2 vs Smyslov
and the whole thing's on ice.

His weak play? I'd call it consistent with a temperament
that could not handle extreme stress (a condition that
only started after the annexation of Estonia but thereafter
lasted pretty much his whole career, e.g. Curaco 1962)
and an emotional state perhaps also due to the annexation
("he absolutely hated the Russians" according to a source
of mine - imagine keeping that from plain sight for decades
and pretending to like people you despise!). His win came
after the title was lost. Less stress - and perhaps less
motivation for Botvinnik.

In summary, I think there is a reasonable alternative
explanation for the weak play, and I think the Soviets
would have fixed the event more intelligently, had they
chosen to fix it. Thus the games are in no way the
equivalent to the Zapruder film. That shows a crime being
committed, the games show a number of very weak moves, but
that is hardly a crime, or even novelty in high level
chess.

Finally there is motivation. Reshevsky had had little
hard practice since 1938, had finished behind Botvinnik
at AVRO, and was less likely to keep up in a long event.
The Soviet players were well trained and rested, (months
of preparation, rest, and exercise) and would be playing
half the event on home ground. Reshevsky (and Euwe)
would have to work right up to the opening of the event
(a week or two of rest at most, and probably none),
and hence would not be as well prepared and certainly not
as well rested. Finally the Soviets would have a group of
strong GM seconds, while the westerners would have weaker
players, or no seconds at all. Even if Reshevsky were
Botvinnik's
equal and Smyslov and Keres somewhat weaker I'd say his odds
of winning the event would for these reasons have been
close to zero. And I'm sure the Soviet chess establishment
knew this. No point in massive cheating when the result
is preordained. At most, make Keres or Smyslov drop a
critical game towards the end, if Reshevsky is challenging
seriously for first place.

Note that if we accept that Keres threw a net three games (assuming
that Botvinnik's loss to him was a game thrown in payback) we have to
consider that even so he finished even with Reshevsky. That seems to
imply that Reshevsky wasn't that big a threat.


While reticence serves equally well in such circumstances as we witness in
these threads, can there still be meaningful discussion beyond the spats of
previous contestants?

We can agree that pressure applied, even without specific orders, can
make a player unable to do his best. And at high levels even a slight
weakening is fatal.

We can analyse statements for plausibility (would Botvinnik really
disobey an order from Stalin? On the other hand, would he really
know, for sure, that an order came from Stalin himself?).

We can look at patterns. Is the result consistent with an organized
conspiracy to throw games? I think not, on the grounds that it would
be stupid to throw the games in that manner. Is it consistent with
Keres's nature and political pressure applied? I think so. Which
proves nothing, of course. Maybe they were that stupid.

We can look at equivalent cases. If Keres was somehow the "wrong"
soviet to be champion, why let Bronstein, son of a political prisoner
and even then something of a maverick himself, win the Candidates
event? Boleslavsky would have been no threat to Botvinnik, as he said
himself. One draw and Boleslavsky is the challenger. Why let Keres
beat Tal 3-1 in the 1959 event, if Keres is to be kept from the
championship at all costs?

I've always liked Keres' chess, and I like to think that if WWII had
never happened, his chess growth after 1938 would have carried him to
the title.
Keres was an Estonian who had to live most of his adult life under
foreign occupation, and had to pretend to like it. I recall how much
better Kortchnoi played, despite his age, after he left the Soviet
Union, and wonder what Keres might have done in similar circumstances.

William Hyde