In article ,
wrote:
On this matter I must basically agree with Parr. In his
autobiography, Botvinnik describes how he himself was the main author
of the regulations FIDE adopted for world championship matches and
challenger qualifying. I'm not sure whether they were then "imposed"
on FIDE, or FIDE just adopted them willingly, but either way Botvinnik
and his Soviet supporters got what they wanted.
Does or did anyone think it mattered?
That's rather beside the point I was trying to make, Andy. The point
of my post was simply to say that Parr had given the historial facts
accurately on this particular occasion.

I don't see how "FIDE set up this system ... to protect Soviet
supremacy" [LP] and "The USSR imposed the system ... in 1948" [LP] is
compatible with your doubts expressed above *combined with* your claim
that LP had given the facts accurately. On the *facts* as thus far
stated, all we seem to know is that Botvinnik proposed some regulations
and FIDE approved them. Botvinnik can scarcely have *planned* to draw
or lose his five matches as WC [while winning the two re-matches], so
it's a stretch to claim that in 1948 he was setting up the regulations
*in order to* give himself a long stretch as an undeserving WC. What
evidence does anyone have that the USSR *imposed* the MMB regulations,
as opposed to merely forwarding them for approval, and FIDE agreeing
that they were a reasonable basis? Or that FIDE [or even the USSR]
set them up to protect "Soviet supremacy"? Up to 1972, Soviet
supremacy in WC matches would have been equally protected by a rule
that the title should be decided by playing underwater tiddleywinks.

With the exception of the rematch clause, I don't think the
Botvinnik rules were markedly unfair. One could argue that the clause,
by which the incumbent retained his title in the event of a tie match,
was unfair, but it was nothing new, going back at least to Lasker-
Schlechter 1910.

Right. Even the re-match clause could be claimed as part
of the normal "gentlemen's agreement" of the previous era, witness
Alekhine - Euwe and Steinitz - Lasker, and the bad blood caused by
Capablanca's failure [for whatever reason] to secure a return against
Alekhine. I don't see any need to assume any deep plotting, rather
than MMB proposing a formalisation of previous "good practice".

What _was_ unfair were the Soviets' behind the scenes machinations,
e.g. keeping Najdorf out in 1948, and their collusive tactics,
especially in the Candidates Tournaments to ensure that no non-Soviet
player got to be the challenger.

Perhaps, though there's quite a spectrum between normal
tournament practice, through gamesmanship and sharp practice, to
actual cheating.

For the couple of
decades from 1948 until Larsen and then Fischer became serious
contenders,
Fischer became a serious contender before Larsen. They both played
in an Interzonal for the first time in 1958, but Fischer became a FIDE
Candidate first, in 1959, based on his 5th place in that Interzonal.
Larsen placed only 16th in that event, and did not make it to the
Candidates cycle until 1965.

Yes, but (a) the Fischer of 1962 -- still a teenager! -- was,
despite the hype, not yet a serious challenger for the title, as was
indeed shown by the Curacao tournament, and (b) where was Fischer in
the 1965 and 1968 Candidates'? Until 1971, I think there was still a
respectable point of view that Larsen had done more to break the
Soviet hegemony than anyone else, and that Fischer, despite manifest
talent, was too "fragile" as soon as conditions were adverse to be
able to mount a serious assault on Petrosian and Spassky in a long
match.

I never have been able to buy the argument that Soviet cheating was
OK because they would have won anyway without it. Surely you're not
saying that?

"Soviet cheating" is a rather provocative way of describing
things! If you're thinking of Curacao, then I don't see any evidence
of *cheating*, either "Soviet" or personal. Taking a quick draw to
conserve energy when playing someone you're unlikely to beat anyway
is normal tournament practice even today, and the losers by that
practice in 1962 were not Korchnoi and Fischer, who were outclassed
and did little better than Benko, but Keres and Geller, who missed
out by half a point on a "soft" chance at the WC in 1963.

--
Andy Walker
Nottingham