I write this post to clarify one point, which already has been utterly
misunderstood by one reader here (Michael Adams).

(Nick) wrote in message . com...
(snipped)
According to Bevin Alexander, a former official historian for the United
States Army, the notion that the Chinese Communists encouraged a North Korean
invasion of South Korea is "almost certainly" a myth.

"The standard American view was that the Russians egged on the North Koreans
to attack, and that the Russians miscalculated the American response.
Although this theory grew out of the general theory that all communist states
were jointly conspiring against the West, it contained an element of logic.
It was senseless for the North Koreans to risk such a hazardous play with no
stronger hole card than an expressed American policy of nonintervention.
This was the reason for much of the anxiety and uncertainty in Washington and
other Western capitals: Western leaders couldn't believe the North Koreans
would have attacked unless they had assurances that Russia or Red China or
both would come to their aid if the Americans did intervene....

Indeed, if North Korea had such an assurance, it was *never* honored. Far more
likely is that North Korean leaders believed, if they got into trouble, the
Soviet Union or Red China would feel compelled to move to their aid. In fact,
the Soviet Union never made the slightest effort to do so, ignoring even a
U.S. Air Force attack on a Siberian airfield, mistakenly thought by the pilots
to be within North Korea. And Red China's motivations were *unrelated* to
saving the North Korean leaders' necks, but rather to protecting China from
possible American aggression.

There is no evidence the Soviet government actually instigated the invasion.
Rather, the evidence seems preponderant that the North Koreans planned it, and
that the Russians, when informed, went along, hoping with the North Koreans
that the Americans would stay out....

Khrushchev's memories of the course of the war itself contain factual errors.
Whether his memories of Stalin-Kim (Il Sung) and Stalin-Mao talks are more
accurate is impossible to determine....

The case for Chinese Communist involvement in the attack rests *entirely* on
Khrushchev's statement that Stalin consulted with Mao before the attack.
In fact, the Red Chinese could have had *no reason whatsoever to encourage*
adventures in the Far East until they had completed the conquest of Taiwan.
The Reds probably would have launched their attack on the island in the summer
of 1950 if the Korean War had not intervened. Therefore, Chinese advice, if
asked, *almost certainly* would have been *negative*."

--Bevin Alexander (Korea: the First War We Lost, pp. 21-3)

Elsewhere in this thread, Michael Adams has ignorantly denounced me as a
"pureile propagandist", evidently because I had *quoted* exactly the complete
title of Bevin Alexander's history, "Korea: the First War We Lost".
(I recommend the revised edition that was published in 2000.)

Bevin Alexander has explained why he chose that title for his book:

"This book attempts to show that the United States--with the aid of South Korea
and the support of some United Nations members--*won one war* against the North
Koreans and *lost another war* against the Red Chinese. The causes of these
*two wars* were essentially and totally *different*: the North Koreans were
bent on overt aggression and were thwarted; the Red Chinese were trying to
protect their homeland from the potential threat of invasion and were
successful." (p. ix)

Hence, according to Bevin Alexander, "the first war we (the United States)
lost" was to the Chinese in the (second) Korean War.

Bevin Alexander (a Korean War veteran) has written of his sources (pp. xi-xii):

"I have the happy privilege rare among writers to be able to cite as sources
of uch of the material on the Korean War works produced by personal friends
and former comrades in arms. Without the outstanding work done by these and
other researchers this book ould have been impossible. This volume is a product
of the immense amount of work done by dedicated historians over a long period.
The conclusions in this book I lay on no other shoulders but my own; the facts
contained in it are drawn from the rich mines of material uncovered by the
historians and the basic researchers of the war. If this book is accepted as
a fair representation of the immensely involved and complicated story of the
war, it should be seen as a monument to them.

I specifically wish to thank the following army historians, most of whom I
served with in Korea and most of whom, like myself, commanded Historical
Detachments: (list of fifteen United States Army official historians)...
I have not had the pleasure of meeting the authors of the official histories
of the other services, but I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the
essential contributions they have made in their painstaking and accurate
studies: (list of five United States Armed Forces official historians)..."

Bevin Alexander has listed his sources and references in detail (pp. 493-548):

"In my research I have drawn largely from six major types of sources: original
documents in the National Archives; the official histories of the war produced
by the army, navy, air force, marines, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS);
autobiographies and memoirs of major figures involved in the war; State
Department and Archives publications of presidential and diplomatic messages,
statements and decisions; scholarly studies on the war or political and
diplomatic matters related to the war; and contemporary news reports, mostly
from the 'New York Times', and articles in the English-language
'People's China', published in Beijing."
--Bevin Alexander (2000, revised edition, p. 493)

In short, Bevin Alexander's history of the Korean War was written while almost
completely relying on official or semi-official United States sources.

And, as evident from Alexander's continual usage of the rather disparaging
term, "Red China", instead of the diplomatically correct, "People's Republic
of China", or simply, "China", any political bias in his history, "Korea: the
First War We Lost" would seem to be directed *against* the Communists.

'If we act only for ourselves, to neglect the study of history is not prudent;
if we are entrusted with the care of others, it is not just.'
--Samuel Johnson (Rasselas)

--Nick