On Nov 17, 5:12 pm, "Chess One" wrote:
Bill, in light of our interview, and Taimanov's response, what is your
opinion on all this matter?

I don't have a lot of time now to reply, so I append something I wrote
a few
years ago. It still seems reasonable to me, barring the important
omission
that Keres knew he'd be in big trouble if he played the spoiler and
let Reshevsky win by beating Botvinnik. This added extra pressure
which I'm sure was not good for his play vs Botvinnik (of which more
see below).

I would also add that if I were organizing the conspiracy, I would
split the losses more evenly between Keres and Smyslov. If they both
went -2 that would be plausible and guarantee Botvinnik a win. Even
if it went as it did, I would order
Botvinnik and Keres to draw their third game, for a more plausible
looking result.

I think Smyslov got the same warning as Keres, but his nerves were
always steadier so his play was less affected.



[...]


The soviets were no fools. If they insisted that the
WC be thrown, a mere +2 for Keres vs Botvinnik would have
been sufficient, and in view of 1940 fairly unsurprising.
Two wins for Botvinnik and three draws would have surprised
nobody and given that each player would in effect have five
extra rest days would give them the energy to really go
after Reshevsky. Throw in a guaranteed +2 vs Smyslov
and the whole thing's on ice.

His weak play? I'd call it consistent with a temperament
that could not handle extreme stress (a condition that
only started after the annexation of Estonia but thereafter
lasted pretty much his whole career, e.g. Curaco 1962)
and an emotional state perhaps also due to the annexation
("he absolutely hated the Russians" according to a source
of mine - imagine keeping that from plain sight for decades
and pretending to like people you despise!). His win came
after the title was lost. Less stress - and perhaps less
motivation for Botvinnik.

In summary, I think there is a reasonable alternative
explanation for the weak play, and I think the Soviets
would have fixed the event more intelligently, had they
chosen to fix it. Thus the games are in no way the
equivalent to the Zapruder film. That shows a crime being
committed, the games show a number of very weak moves, but
that is hardly a crime, or even novelty in high level
chess.

Finally there is motivation. Reshevsky had had little
hard practice since 1938, had finished behind Botvinnik
at AVRO, and was less likely to keep up in a long event.
The Soviet players were well trained and rested, (months
of preparation, rest, and exercise) and would be playing
half the event on home ground. Reshevsky (and Euwe)
would have to work right up to the opening of the event
(a week or two of rest at most, and probably none),
and hence would not be as well prepared and certainly not
as well rested. Finally the Soviets would have a group of
strong GM seconds, while the westerners would have weaker
players, or no seconds at all. Even if Reshevsky were
Botvinnik's
equal and Smyslov and Keres somewhat weaker I'd say his odds
of winning the event would for these reasons have been
close to zero. And I'm sure the Soviet chess establishment
knew this. No point in massive cheating when the result
is preordained. At most, make Keres or Smyslov drop a
critical game towards the end, if Reshevsky is challenging
seriously for first place.

Note that if we accept that Keres threw a net three games (assuming
that Botvinnik's loss to him was a game thrown in payback) we have to
consider that even so he finished even with Reshevsky. That seems to
imply that Reshevsky wasn't that big a threat.


While reticence serves equally well in such circumstances as we witness in
these threads, can there still be meaningful discussion beyond the spats of
previous contestants?

We can agree that pressure applied, even without specific orders, can
make a player unable to do his best. And at high levels even a slight
weakening is fatal.

We can analyse statements for plausibility (would Botvinnik really
disobey an order from Stalin? On the other hand, would he really
know, for sure, that an order came from Stalin himself?).

We can look at patterns. Is the result consistent with an organized
conspiracy to throw games? I think not, on the grounds that it would
be stupid to throw the games in that manner. Is it consistent with
Keres's nature and political pressure applied? I think so. Which
proves nothing, of course. Maybe they were that stupid.

We can look at equivalent cases. If Keres was somehow the "wrong"
soviet to be champion, why let Bronstein, son of a political prisoner
and even then something of a maverick himself, win the Candidates
event? Boleslavsky would have been no threat to Botvinnik, as he said
himself. One draw and Boleslavsky is the challenger. Why let Keres
beat Tal 3-1 in the 1959 event, if Keres is to be kept from the
championship at all costs?

I've always liked Keres' chess, and I like to think that if WWII had
never happened, his chess growth after 1938 would have carried him to
the title.
Keres was an Estonian who had to live most of his adult life under
foreign occupation, and had to pretend to like it. I recall how much
better Kortchnoi played, despite his age, after he left the Soviet
Union, and wonder what Keres might have done in similar circumstances.

William Hyde

On Nov 18, 6:59 pm, Louis Blair wrote:
Larry Parr wrote (Sat, 17 Nov 2007 07:06:18 -0800 (PST)):

7 ... Louie Blair (the nutty professor) ...
_
_
"... name-calling and mud-slinging, I eschew
that kind of stuff ..." - Larry Parr (7 Jun 2005


"That rule applies to Russian cheaters, not to me."
-- Bobby Fischer (after being caught doing the
grandmaster-draw tango).


-- help bot

A thoughtful post, Bill. I add a few comments here and the

On Nov 19, 3:36 pm, William Hyde wrote:
On Nov 17, 5:12 pm, "Chess One" wrote:

Bill, in light of our interview, and Taimanov's response, what is your
opinion on all this matter?

I don't have a lot of time now to reply, so I append something I wrote
a few
years ago. It still seems reasonable to me, barring the important
omission
that Keres knew he'd be in big trouble if he played the spoiler and
let Reshevsky win by beating Botvinnik. This added extra pressure
which I'm sure was not good for his play vs Botvinnik (of which more
see below).

I quite agree. I do not see how Keres could possibly have done his
best under the circumstances. He would have been distracted at the
very least, when total concentration was required. Thus, even if no
direct threat or instruction to throw games was given, I still
consider this tampering and tantamount to fixing.

I would also add that if I were organizing the conspiracy, I would
split the losses more evenly between Keres and Smyslov. If they both
went -2 that would be plausible and guarantee Botvinnik a win. Even
if it went as it did, I would order
Botvinnik and Keres to draw their third game, for a more plausible
looking result.

I think Smyslov got the same warning as Keres, but his nerves were
always steadier so his play was less affected.

[...]

The soviets were no fools. If they insisted that the
WC be thrown, a mere +2 for Keres vs Botvinnik would have
been sufficient, and in view of 1940 fairly unsurprising.
Two wins for Botvinnik and three draws would have surprised
nobody and given that each player would in effect have five
extra rest days would give them the energy to really go
after Reshevsky. Throw in a guaranteed +2 vs Smyslov
and the whole thing's on ice.

His weak play? I'd call it consistent with a temperament
that could not handle extreme stress (a condition that
only started after the annexation of Estonia but thereafter
lasted pretty much his whole career, e.g. Curaco 1962)
and an emotional state perhaps also due to the annexation
("he absolutely hated the Russians" according to a source
of mine - imagine keeping that from plain sight for decades
and pretending to like people you despise!). His win came
after the title was lost. Less stress - and perhaps less
motivation for Botvinnik.

In summary, I think there is a reasonable alternative
explanation for the weak play, and I think the Soviets
would have fixed the event more intelligently, had they
chosen to fix it. Thus the games are in no way the
equivalent to the Zapruder film. That shows a crime being
committed, the games show a number of very weak moves, but
that is hardly a crime, or even novelty in high level
chess.

Quite so.

Finally there is motivation. Reshevsky had had little
hard practice since 1938, had finished behind Botvinnik
at AVRO, and was less likely to keep up in a long event.
The Soviet players were well trained and rested, (months
of preparation, rest, and exercise) and would be playing
half the event on home ground. Reshevsky (and Euwe)
would have to work right up to the opening of the event
(a week or two of rest at most, and probably none),
and hence would not be as well prepared and certainly not
as well rested. Finally the Soviets would have a group of
strong GM seconds, while the westerners would have weaker
players, or no seconds at all. Even if Reshevsky were
Botvinnik's
equal and Smyslov and Keres somewhat weaker I'd say his odds
of winning the event would for these reasons have been
close to zero. And I'm sure the Soviet chess establishment
knew this. No point in massive cheating when the result
is preordained. At most, make Keres or Smyslov drop a
critical game towards the end, if Reshevsky is challenging
seriously for first place.

Note that if we accept that Keres threw a net three games (assuming
that Botvinnik's loss to him was a game thrown in payback) we have to
consider that even so he finished even with Reshevsky. That seems to
imply that Reshevsky wasn't that big a threat.

While reticence serves equally well in such circumstances as we witness in
these threads, can there still be meaningful discussion beyond the spats of
previous contestants?

We can agree that pressure applied, even without specific orders, can
make a player unable to do his best. And at high levels even a slight
weakening is fatal.

We can analyse statements for plausibility (would Botvinnik really
disobey an order from Stalin? On the other hand, would he really
know, for sure, that an order came from Stalin himself?).

We can look at patterns. Is the result consistent with an organized
conspiracy to throw games? I think not, on the grounds that it would
be stupid to throw the games in that manner. Is it consistent with
Keres's nature and political pressure applied? I think so. Which
proves nothing, of course. Maybe they were that stupid.

We can look at equivalent cases. If Keres was somehow the "wrong"
soviet to be champion, why let Bronstein, son of a political prisoner
and even then something of a maverick himself, win the Candidates
event? Boleslavsky would have been no threat to Botvinnik, as he said
himself. One draw and Boleslavsky is the challenger.

The key to understanding that tournament, the 1950 Candidates, is in
my opinion Boris Vainstein, high-ranking Soviet official, ally of
Bronstein. Vainstein and Botvinnik shared a strong mutual antipathy.
One reason was that Vainstein, if I recall correctly, opposed
Botvinnik's efforts to play Alekhine, stigmatized as he was by
defection and Nazi collaboration. This of course became moot when AA
died, but resentment lingered.
Anyway, as Bronstein stated on page 107 of "The Sorcerer's
Apprentice," the reason Boleslavsky slowed down and allowed Bronstein
to tie him at Budapest 1950, was that Vainstein hoped to arrange a 3-
way match-tournament for the title, between Botvinnik, Boleslavsky,
and Bronstein, and persuaded the latter two that he probably could.
Thus they arranged to tie atop the final standings.
Discussing this with British historian Bernard Cafferty (an expert
on Soviet chess), he told me Botvinnik would have none of this,
suspecting (not without reason) that Boleslavsky and Bronstein would
collude against him. Thus instead there was a Candidates' playoff,
which Bronstein won.
I agree that Botvinnik would probably have preferred to play
Boleslavsky, against whom he had a big plus score, but apparently he
was either unaware of Vainstein's manipulations, or he lacked
sufficient influence to counter them, or he simply chose not to do
anything about them while the tournament was going on. But he was not
about to accept being odd man out in a triangular event.

Why let Keres
beat Tal 3-1 in the 1959 event, if Keres is to be kept from the
championship at all costs?

I've always liked Keres' chess, and I like to think that if WWII had
never happened, his chess growth after 1938 would have carried him to
the title.
Keres was an Estonian who had to live most of his adult life under
foreign occupation, and had to pretend to like it. I recall how much
better Kortchnoi played, despite his age, after he left the Soviet
Union, and wonder what Keres might have done in similar circumstances.

William Hyde

On Nov 19, 5:07 pm, Taylor Kingston wrote:
I agree that Botvinnik would probably have preferred to play
Boleslavsky, against whom he had a big plus score, but apparently he
was either unaware of Vainstein's manipulations, or he lacked
sufficient influence to counter them,

This bears on a point I forgot to make.

It seems to be a mistake to assume that there was only one view in the
upper circles of Soviet chess. There were usually several centres of
power, and even Botvinnik could be defeated politically.

I seem to recall a CL&R column (in the Parr years) by Alburt in which
he commented that both Karpov and Kasparov had Kremlin connections,
but different and opposing ones. This does not appear to have been a
new situation.

or he simply chose not to do
anything about them while the tournament was going on. But he was not
about to accept being odd man out in a triangular event.

That would be easy to fight against, as it would involve getting FIDE
to overthrow its new system, and the Soviets wanted to look like
reliable FIDE supporters.


William Hyde

On Nov 19, 6:19 pm, William Hyde wrote:
On Nov 19, 5:07 pm, Taylor Kingston wrote:
I agree that Botvinnik would probably have preferred to play

Boleslavsky, against whom he had a big plus score, but apparently he
was either unaware of Vainstein's manipulations, or he lacked
sufficient influence to counter them,

This bears on a point I forgot to make.

It seems to be a mistake to assume that there was only one view in the
upper circles of Soviet chess. There were usually several centres of
power, and even Botvinnik could be defeated politically.

Quite so. As I wrote in 2001 (http://www.chesscafe.com/text/
skittles165.pdf), on the question of whether coercion on Keres might
have continued after 1948:

"Cafferty points out that in mid-1954, Botvinnik suffered something
of a fall from grace, the result of a 4-page letter he wrote to the
leaders of the new post-Stalin regime, which appeared in the Russian
journal Istorichesky Arkhiv (#2/1993, pp. 58-67). The letter dealt
with the highly-charged topic of socialist revolution in western
countries. Evidently its ideas were too unorthodox. The official reply
from the Central Committee was sternly critical, going so far as to
suggest that Botvinnik might not belong in the Communist Party!
Botvinnik apparently recanted his heresy, but the damage was done.
Cafferty says 'So, Botvinnik was not in such good standing with the CP
after 1954, when the emergence of other challengers meant that support
of [Botvinnik] was no longer such a vital government priority.'"

I seem to recall a CL&R column (in the Parr years) by Alburt in which
he commented that both Karpov and Kasparov had Kremlin connections,
but different and opposing ones. This does not appear to have been a
new situation.

or he simply chose not to do
anything about them while the tournament was going on. But he was not
about to accept being odd man out in a triangular event.

That would be easy to fight against, as it would involve getting FIDE
to overthrow its new system, and the Soviets wanted to look like
reliable FIDE supporters.

William Hyde

On Nov 19, 1:21 pm, William Hyde wrote:
On Nov 18, 7:13 pm, The Historian

Mr. Parr has also "admitted" I am a historian.

I will also do so, without the quotes. I've enjoyed many of your
articles.

I'm not aware a "Neil Brennan" posts here.

My mistake.

As for the matter of 'credentialism', the tale of the Nearly an IM
2450 reminds me of the case of John Baker,

A doctorate is granted by an accredited institution, and is a matter
of record. Ratings are more equivocal. My highest USCF rating, for
example, is somewhere around 2175. But I have been rated over 2200,
even over 2300, on other organization's lists.

Were I to claim to have been a master (on the grounds that I was over
2200 "between lists" or on account of my rating on other systems ) it
would reveal perhaps something about my ego. But my arguments on
other issues would be no better or worse on that account.

But do you have a track record of lying and distortion? Do you have a
history of threatening other posters? Reputation counts too. Were you
a notorious crank, then people may question your self-described master
title.

On matters other than evaluation of positions, it does not matter
whether Taylor Kingston was of NM strength, or Phil Innes of 2450
strength, and continual references to same have gone from irritating,
to annoying, to ... I know not what comes next. Grating? If I could
create a kill file, rest assured that Larry would be in it, just on
the basis if his
repeated "NMnot" usage.

Mr. Innes' "evaluations of positions", in chess or away from the
board, are NOT judged by his playing strength, either real or self-
described. If he were to make a good point, I would agree with it -
and in fact have done so from time to time.

I don't want to get involved, in any way, with your years-long feud
with Phil. If you feel the desire to respond to this, suppress it
ruthlessly and write another article. Takes longer, but it has to be
more satisfying when done. Perhaps one on "frauds in chess"? *Not*
including anyone posting here, of course.

William Hyde

Thank you for the kind words, Dr. Hyde. But I hasten to assure you, as
I have stated before, I have no 'feud' with Nearly an IM 2450 Innes.
But if he wishes to appear as a fool in public, he should be aware
that some of us don't suffer fools, but like to see fools suffer.

"William Hyde" wrote in message
...

vast snippage...to gain focus on general context of the times

While reticence serves equally well in such circumstances as we witness in
these threads, can there still be meaningful discussion beyond the spats
of
previous contestants?

We can agree that pressure applied, even without specific orders, can
make a player unable to do his best. And at high levels even a slight
weakening is fatal.

We can analyse statements for plausibility (would Botvinnik really
disobey an order from Stalin? On the other hand, would he really
know, for sure, that an order came from Stalin himself?).

We can look at patterns. Is the result consistent with an organized
conspiracy to throw games? I think not, on the grounds that it would
be stupid to throw the games in that manner. Is it consistent with
Keres's nature and political pressure applied? I think so. Which
proves nothing, of course. Maybe they were that stupid.

We can look at equivalent cases. If Keres was somehow the "wrong"
soviet to be champion, why let Bronstein, son of a political prisoner
and even then something of a maverick himself, win the Candidates
event? Boleslavsky would have been no threat to Botvinnik, as he said
himself. One draw and Boleslavsky is the challenger. Why let Keres
beat Tal 3-1 in the 1959 event, if Keres is to be kept from the
championship at all costs?

Well ... this is all good stuff, and we have rehersed the conversation
before, and exercising it always admits new factors. Should I chose to be
very cycical at this point; the Estonian is allowed to win over the Latvian,
since he was seen to be the lesser threat to Botvinnik, or one more
vulnerable to suggest at the time? And just to compound the issue, why let
any of them reign as champion very long since they are all 'foreigners or
jews'?

In terms of their respective strength, one to another, certainly in external
events they could not fix, they were certainly all very capable.

Hastings 61/61 Botvinnik first with 8
Hastings 63/64 Tal first with 7
Hastings 64/65 Keres first with 8
and to continue
Hastings 65/66 Spassky first with 7.7 [Equal Uhlmann]
Hastings 66/67 Botvinnik first with 6.5

I wonder if the 'fix' was simply to rotate champions, or at least parade a
whole group of them in the West, since too much singularity defeats the idea
of group superiority according to a system - that was the political point of
all.

I've always liked Keres' chess, and I like to think that if WWII had
never happened, his chess growth after 1938 would have carried him to
the title.
Keres was an Estonian who had to live most of his adult life under
foreign occupation, and had to pretend to like it. I recall how much
better Kortchnoi played, despite his age, after he left the Soviet
Union, and wonder what Keres might have done in similar circumstances.

One wonders indeed what he and Alekhine were doing in Munich in 1942 at all,
instead of 'doing' something in New York? Alekhine seems completely
apolitical, and possibly even amoral, but not imperceptive of political
forces, almost like the young Fischer.

And Alekhine had seen the whole nightmare before - including the paranoid
aftermath witchunting for foreign spies which put him in a death cell. [[GM
Golubev, incidentally has information on this, in an Alekhine archive in the
Crimea.]]

I always wanted to novelise a conversation between Keres Alekhine during
that Munich tournament, since /surely/ Alekhine would have told Keres his
opinion of the /likely/ result of returning to the S. U. and what a massive
risk that was, whereas going the other way was no risk at all, and he could
be, -I agree with you-, Champion of the West, maybe the World, but certainly
get paid real dollars for it.

Cordially, Phil Innes

William Hyde

WHAT ALEKHINE TOLD KERES

I always wanted to novelise a conversation between Keres Alekhine during
that Munich tournament, since /surely/ Alekhine would have told Keres his
opinion of the /likely/ result of returning to the S. U. and what a massive
risk that was. -- Phil Innes

I recall reading somewhere that while they were in Nazi-occupied
territory Alekhine warned Keres not to return to the USSR. In THE
TRAGEDY OF PAUL KERES (Chess Life, October 1996, page 49) GM Larry
Evans noted:

"Botvinnik was then absolute champion of the Soviet Union (which had
swallowed Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) while Keres was in trouble
for having competed in Nazi-organized tournaments during the war. The
KGB wanted to execute Keres for treason, and his family was also in
peril. His case was examined at the highest level in the Kremlin; they
let him rejoin his family in Estonia, but the price of his reprieve
was to abandon his quest for the crown."


Chess One wrote:
"William Hyde" wrote in message
...

vast snippage...to gain focus on general context of the times

While reticence serves equally well in such circumstances as we witness in
these threads, can there still be meaningful discussion beyond the spats
of
previous contestants?

We can agree that pressure applied, even without specific orders, can
make a player unable to do his best. And at high levels even a slight
weakening is fatal.

We can analyse statements for plausibility (would Botvinnik really
disobey an order from Stalin? On the other hand, would he really
know, for sure, that an order came from Stalin himself?).

We can look at patterns. Is the result consistent with an organized
conspiracy to throw games? I think not, on the grounds that it would
be stupid to throw the games in that manner. Is it consistent with
Keres's nature and political pressure applied? I think so. Which
proves nothing, of course. Maybe they were that stupid.

We can look at equivalent cases. If Keres was somehow the "wrong"
soviet to be champion, why let Bronstein, son of a political prisoner
and even then something of a maverick himself, win the Candidates
event? Boleslavsky would have been no threat to Botvinnik, as he said
himself. One draw and Boleslavsky is the challenger. Why let Keres
beat Tal 3-1 in the 1959 event, if Keres is to be kept from the
championship at all costs?

Well ... this is all good stuff, and we have rehersed the conversation
before, and exercising it always admits new factors. Should I chose to be
very cycical at this point; the Estonian is allowed to win over the Latvian,
since he was seen to be the lesser threat to Botvinnik, or one more
vulnerable to suggest at the time? And just to compound the issue, why let
any of them reign as champion very long since they are all 'foreigners or
jews'?

In terms of their respective strength, one to another, certainly in external
events they could not fix, they were certainly all very capable.

Hastings 61/61 Botvinnik first with 8
Hastings 63/64 Tal first with 7
Hastings 64/65 Keres first with 8
and to continue
Hastings 65/66 Spassky first with 7.7 [Equal Uhlmann]
Hastings 66/67 Botvinnik first with 6.5

I wonder if the 'fix' was simply to rotate champions, or at least parade a
whole group of them in the West, since too much singularity defeats the idea
of group superiority according to a system - that was the political point of
all.

I've always liked Keres' chess, and I like to think that if WWII had
never happened, his chess growth after 1938 would have carried him to
the title.
Keres was an Estonian who had to live most of his adult life under
foreign occupation, and had to pretend to like it. I recall how much
better Kortchnoi played, despite his age, after he left the Soviet
Union, and wonder what Keres might have done in similar circumstances.

One wonders indeed what he and Alekhine were doing in Munich in 1942 at all,
instead of 'doing' something in New York? Alekhine seems completely
apolitical, and possibly even amoral, but not imperceptive of political
forces, almost like the young Fischer.

And Alekhine had seen the whole nightmare before - including the paranoid
aftermath witchunting for foreign spies which put him in a death cell. [[GM
Golubev, incidentally has information on this, in an Alekhine archive in the
Crimea.]]

I always wanted to novelise a conversation between Keres Alekhine during
that Munich tournament, since /surely/ Alekhine would have told Keres his
opinion of the /likely/ result of returning to the S. U. and what a massive
risk that was, whereas going the other way was no risk at all, and he could
be, -I agree with you-, Champion of the West, maybe the World, but certainly
get paid real dollars for it.

Cordially, Phil Innes

William Hyde

On Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:38:50 GMT, "Chess One"
wrote:


I always wanted to novelise a conversation between Keres Alekhine during
that Munich tournament, since /surely/ Alekhine would have told Keres his
opinion of the /likely/ result of returning to the S. U. and what a massive
risk that was, whereas going the other way was no risk at all, and he could
be, -I agree with you-, Champion of the West, maybe the World, but certainly
get paid real dollars for it.


Did Keres' family situation allow this?

On Nov 20, 12:37 pm, Mike Murray wrote:
On Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:38:50 GMT, "Chess One"
wrote:

I always wanted to novelise a conversation between Keres Alekhine during
that Munich tournament, since /surely/ Alekhine would have told Keres his
opinion of the /likely/ result of returning to the S. U. and what a massive
risk that was, whereas going the other way was no risk at all, and he could
be, -I agree with you-, Champion of the West, maybe the World, but certainly
get paid real dollars for it.

Did Keres' family situation allow this?

I don't know about during most of WW II, but toward the end, when
the USSR was re-taking Estonia from the Germans, Keres had a chance to
get away. However, it would have been escape for him alone. He was not
willing to abandon his wife and children.