On Mar 28, 12:06 am, Offramp wrote:

There is also the problem that Fischer had caused all these problems -
postponements, the room, Kissinger, Slater - and the first game was
really really dull up to move 28. When he saw that there was ½ a
chance to make the game interesting he took it.


That is not a very good theory because if you
really want to make a chess game "interesting",
the last thing you would do is wait until you are
in such an ending and *only then* do something
crazy!

The opening phase is where you make such
decisions, but I don't think Bobby Fischer even
had a risky/unsound line as Black against 1. d4
in his repertoire; he generally played a KID if he
wanted a decisive game, I think. If he was okay
with a draw, it makes no difference whether the
game was interesting or dull, just so long as he
knew he would get White in the /next game/.

The most recent game of Boris Spassky's
I've seen had him "milking" a tiny advantage
against GM Portish-- who fell apart and lost in
what many folks would call a dull, boring, very
drawish position. The thing is, a game does
not draw itself; you have to play well to *earn*
such draws. And if you can't do that, then it
is really silly to fault BS for simplifying as
White, just as it is silly to fault him for
playing the King's Gambit and being behind
by a pawn the whole game (yet winning
anyway).

By the way, the "room" problem did not
occur until *after* this particular game, so it
is silly to toss that in as a reason for him
blundering. If anything, the actions of the
other two (Mr. Slater and Mr. Kissinger)
would argue for accurate, not reckless play
on GM Fischer's part. The search for off-
the-board causes reveals a desperate need
to avoid facing the fact that even BF was
human; that even he occasionally mis-
calculated or was simply outplayed; but as
even GM Fischer himself admitted...

"Some days you give a (chess) lesson,
and some days you get a lesson".


-- help bot

"Freelancer71" wrote in message
...
Can anyone explain how/why Fischer lost is bishop in the first game of his
match against Spassky in 1972?
The fact that a bishop capturing the h2 or a2 pawn and getting trapped after
g3 or b3 is trivial. Everyone knows that. Did he really think he had chances
after sacrificing the bishop for two (or three?) pawns?


We are always being told how "real" chessplayers appreciate draws and
high quality chess. I've always wondered how that theory squares with the
fact that one of the most discussed games in chess history was not
only decisive but contained a rather elemental blunder. Had Fischer
played a "correct" move leading to a draw a few moves later, this game
would have been completely unremarkable.