I. INTRODUCTION
In their opposition brief, plaintiffs offer only a desultory defense of
their counsel's unethical conduct. Plaintiffs instead argue, without
citation to case law, that Polgar has no right to bring her motion, and
that plaintiffs effectively waived any conflicts that obtained from
Kronenberger's employment. But plaintiffs are wrong.
Polgar has standing both as a USCF Executive Board member and as an
aggrieved party to move to disqualify Kronenberger. The waivers
Kronenberger attempted to obtain came too late and, moreover, should
have been presented to the USCF's governing Board of Delegates rather
than to his co-defendants in this and related litigations. Indeed,
Polgar would have failed her fiduciary duties to the federation's
membership if she hadn't brought this motion while there remains an
opportunity for the organization to recover the funds that its directors
have misappropriated. In short, plaintiffs' opposition is meritless.
More telling is what plaintiffs concede. Plaintiffs do not contest that
their counsel:
* misrepresented in prior pleadings and statements to the Court
that the federation's Executive Board had designated a "litigation
committee" to initiate this lawsuit, when no such committee was formed
until April 2009;1
* filed a lawsuit against Polgar in Illinois on behalf of the
federation in contravention of the vote of the USCF's governing Board of
Delegates;2
* attempted to interfere with Polgar's insurance defense in a
related case, while contemporaneously holding himself out to her as an
attorney who was conducting an unbiased investigation on behalf of the
federation;3
* attempted to interfere with Polgar's husband's bankruptcy
proceeding for what he perceived to be a strategic advantage;4
* fed information obtained through uncontested subpoenas, and
designated confidential under the protective order in this case, to one
of his co-defendants in the Texas litigation, who then discussed that
evidence online;5
* never informed the USCF's governing Board of Delegates of
Polgar's offer to settle with the federation for a dollar;6
* abused California's "doe" discovery procedures to seek
evidence to defend himself in a related federal action;? and
* advised naming Polgar as a defendant in this action without
having obtained a single item of evidence during the "doe" discovery
period that implicated Polgar in the alleged theft of a board member's
email.8
In light of the extensive record of Kronenberger's ethical violations,
Polgar respectfully requests that the Court grant her motion to disqualify.
II. ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs oppose the motion to disqualify on three grounds. They argue
that Polgar lacks standing to bring it, because she and her husband
understood that Kronenberger was adverse to them upon his retention,
that Kronenberger disclosed his conflicts and interests in the subject
matter of the litigation to plaintiffs and obtained appropriate waivers,
and that disqualification would be expensive for the federation. See
Opp. at 4-6. As set forth below, each of these contentions is either
incorrect or irrelevant.
A. Polgar Has Standing to Move to Disqualify Kronenberger
Plaintiffs argue that Polgar lacks standing to move to disqualify their
counsel under either Cal. R. Prof. Conduct ("Rule") 3-310(C) or 3-600(D)
because Kronenberger never represented Polgar. See Opp. at 4.9
Plaintiffs are mistaken. Kronenberger owed Polgar duties of
confidentiality and loyalty, at least until such time as he disclosed an
interest adverse to hers, because Polgar is an Executive Board member of
a client organization. See Rule 3-600(D). Further, even if Kronenberger
had never owed Polgar any duties as his client, Polgar would still have
standing to bring her motion because, as she has already set forth,
Kronenberger's many ethical breaches have harmed her interests and
continue to interfere with the just determination of her claims and
defenses. See Motion at 9-14, 18-21, 24-25.
1. Non-Client Litigants May
Move to Disqualify Opposing Counsel
Although to plaintiffs it is "evident from the face of [Rule 3-310(C)]
.... that the party moving to disqualify an attorney must be a client
[or] former client of such attorney" (Opp. at 4), ! the courts disagree.
"The right to disqualify counsel is within the discretion of the trial
court as an exercise of its inherent powers." Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First
Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing
United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1996)). A court
may consider a motion to disqualify counsel brought by a "non-client
litigant" based on its "obligation to manage the conduct of attorneys
who appear before it and to ensure the fair administration of justice."
Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991)). The moving party
need only "establish a personal stake in the motion to disqualify
sufficient to satisfy the 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of
Article III." Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 971.1° "Where the ethical breach
is so severe that it 'obstructs the orderly administration of justice,'
the party who finds [her] claims obstructed has standing." Id. at 972
(citing Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir.
1999)).
Courts in this district and circuit have routinely considered motions to
disqualify
opposing counsel for breach of the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality, where such a breach "impacts the moving party's
interest in a just and lawful determination of her claims." Id. at 971.
For example, in Decaview, the court held that a corporate subsidiary had
a sufficient interest in its parent's financial records to grant it
standing to move to disqualify the parent's counsel, when that lawyer
failed to maintain the confidentiality of the information. Id., 2000 WL
1175583 at *10. The court was "convinced ... that the law in the Ninth
Circuit regarding non-client
, standing is sufficiently established as to allow [the subsidiary], a
non-client, standing to raise an objection to the representation of an
opposing party." Id. at *3.11
In Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 818-19 (N.D. Cal.
2004), the court held that a non-client with an ownership interest in a
party had standing to bring a motion to disqualify counsel for that
party. The court noted that a "much stricter standard applied] to
conflicts arising from concurrent representation," and suggested that in
such cases a party seeking to establish non-client standing faced a
lesser burden. Id. at 819; see also Simonca v. Mukasey, 2008 WL 5113757
at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008) (moving party has standing to disqualify
if it demonstrates that "opposing counsel's representation in the case
causes the movant injury"); In re Cellcyte Genetic Corp. Secs.
Litigation, 2008 WL 5000156 at *1-*2 (W.D. Wa. Nov. 20, 2008)
(recognizing non-client standing to disqualify counsel where concurrent
representation interfered with "the integrity of the process" and the
rights of the litigants); FMC Techs., Inc. v. Edwards, 420 F. Supp. 2d
1153, 1156-57 (W.D. Wa. 2006) (Non- client plaintiffs showed that "the
ethical conflict at issue here sufficiently impacts the just and lawful
determination of their claims and that the conflict involved is so
intertwined with the current litigation that this Court must consider
plaintiffs' motion to disqualify defendants'
' counsel"); Jameison v. Slater, 2006 WL 3421788 at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov.
27, 2006) (where plaintiff "demonstrated that an ethical breach of
conduct by [counsel] in representing [defendants] would likely have a
negative impact on her interest in obtaining a just and lawful
determination of the claims at issue . . . the prudential barrier to
litigating the rights and claims of third parties is overcome by the
Court's inherent obligation to manage the conduct of attorneys who appear
, before it and to ensure the fair administration of justice").
Polgar has already set forth the many ways in which Kronenberger's
misconduct continues to harm her. First, the pendency of this lawsuit is
itself a product of Kronenberger's simultaneous representation of the
USCF and certain interested Executive Board members. Kronenberger
apparently advised the USCF's Executive Director to initiate this
lawsuit as a doe action (and later, to name Polgar as a defendant
without having obtained any evidence to tie her to the hacking of a
board member's personal email account), and advised a handful of
interested Executive Board members to ratify those actions, in
contravention of the USCF's bylaws. See Motion at 5-8, 22-24. The Board
of Delegates has never been granted the opportunity to consider whether
to commit the federation's resources to pursue an individual who
allegedly accessed a board member's emails, nor has Kronenberger ever
advised the delegates (or even, perhaps, the interested board members)
that the federation will have to pay Polgar's attorney fees when she
prevails. See 805 ILCS 105/108.75(c) (requiring indemnification of
director who successfully defends lawsuit).
The only evidence Kronenberger now offers in defense of his conduct in
abetting a set of interested board members in the improper prosecution
of this action is a self-serving declaration. He avers that "[r]egarding
the initiation of the present action, the actions of the USCF were
authorized by the Executive Board of the USCF and thereafter ratified
two separate times."
Deel. of Karl S. Kronenbeger ISO Opp. to Mot. to Disqualify
("Kronenberger Decl."), 10. But j Kronenberger is no longer credible. On
the same day that he entered this declaration stating that the
"Executive Board" authorized "the initiation of the present action," he
filed a brief in which initiating litigation without prior formal
approval of the full Executive Board." See Docket No. 1132 (Opp. to Mot.
for Summary Judgment) at 8.
These contradictory rationalizations are largely irrelevant. The
federation's governing rules prohibit a majority of the Executive Board
from acting outside of the context of a properly called Board meeting at
which all members have the opportunity to vote. See Docket No. 97
(4/27/09 Decl. of Bill Hall ("Hall Decl."), Ex. G at 33-40 (Delegate
Actions of Continuing Interest ("Delegate Actions"), 27(1)(b) ("A Board
majority has no authority except as a majority vote within the context
of a properly called Board meeting in which all members have had the
opportunity to participate"). And even if the interested board members'
attempted "ratifications" were permitted under the rules—if, that is,
plaintiff were correct that the federation's bylaws don't apply to them
because they hold a majority of the seats on the Executive Board—they
would be inadequate because they contain no disclosure of Kronenberger's
or the board members' interests in the subject matter of the
litigations, nor do they disclose the penalties that the federation will
face if it cannot prevail against Polgar. See Hall Decl., Ex. D. What
plaintiffs can no longer dispute is that the Board of Delegates has
never authorized the lawsuit, and that the Executive Board did not
initiate it upon a properly-noticed resolution. See Motion at 8-9. The
harm to Polgar, including the attorney fees she continues to incur, is
immediate.
Second, Kronenberger continues to misrepresent that the federation lacks
internal procedures to resolve this and the related disputes.I2 See
Motion at 19-20. But as Polgar set forth in her motion, Kronenberger
himself requested in August 2008 that the delegates exercise their
authority to sanction and remove Polgar and Truong. Id. Further, months
before the federation filed this lawsuit, Bill Goichberg (the president
of the federation's Executive Board, a third-party defendant in this
case, and one of Kronenberger's co-defendants in the Texas litigation),
acknowledged that "someone should have filed a complaint with the Ethics
Committee," rather than air the core allegations of the related lawsuits
publicly. Decl. of Matthew Springman ISO Reply re Mot. to Disqualify
("Springman Reply Decl."), Ex. A; see also id., Ex. B ("Mr. Goichberg
said that he believed that Mr. Mottershead's report should not have been
released publicly but instead should have been taken to the federation's
ethics committee, which he said has the power to censor or reprimand a
board member or even recommend the person be removed").13
Third, Kronenberger has interfered with Polgar's request for
indemnification in this lawsuit. See Motion at 9-11, 21. Plaintiffs now
claim that Kronenberger "passed on" Polgar's 1 requests for
indemnification to David Herman, the federation's lawyer in the Illinois
case. See
Opp. at 4; Kronenberger Decl., ¶ 12. Plaintiffs do not address why
Kronenberger represented to the Court that Herman had advised the USCF
that Polgar's request was "premature," while Herman himself later denied
that he represented or advised the federation regarding Polgar's
indemnification, or even that the USCF had considered Polgar's requests
at all.
10.14 Nor have plaintiffs explained why Polgar's request for
indemnification for the costs she continues to incur while defending a
frivolous litigation is "premature," while plaintiffs immediately
indemnified themselves and various third parties in the related Texas
case. See Motion at 11 n.16.15 Finally, plaintiffs have offered no
justification for Kronenberger's November 2007 interference with
Polgar's and her husband's insurance defense in the New York litigation,
which occurred prior to the December 7, 2007 deadline for Truong to
respond to the
; questions Kronenberger raised during the investigation he was retained
to conduct. See Motion at 10-12.16
Fourth, Kronenberger violated his duty to communicate Polgar's
settlement offer to the federation's delegates, or indeed to any
competent body other than the interested board members he represents.
See Motion at 14. Plaintiffs assert that this "claim is disingenuous"
because "Polgar refused to settle with all of the Executive Board
members she sued personally, and the USCF owes such Executive Board
members indemnification." Opp. at 4. But plaintiffs have never explained
why a handful of Executive Board members who pursued a frivolous lawsuit
against a fellow board member, conspired to interfere with that board
member's insurance defense in a related lawsuit, and ignored the
federation's bylaws and the authority of its Board of Delegates, should
be entitled to indemnification from the federation's purse. The question of
1 indemnification is for an independent body, and not the interested
directors, to determine. See Hall Deel., Ex. G at 26-33 ("Bylaws"), Art.
IX, § 12. Rather than having a duty to indemnify these interested
parties, the federation will in fact be entitled to a return of the
funds that those men have spent without authorization. See 805 ILCS §
105/103.20 ("All persons who assume to exercise corporate powers without
authority to do so shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts
and liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof').
Kronenberger's failure to forward Polgar's settlement offer to the Board
of Delegates was an automatic violation of his ethical responsibilities.
See Rule 3-510(A) ("A member shall promptly communicate to the member's
client: . (2) All amounts, terms, and conditions of any written offer of
settlement made to the client").17
Kronenberger's ethical violations have marred the integrity of this
litigation from its inception. The harm that Polgar continues to suffer
demonstrates her "personal stake" in Kronenberger's representation. See
Colyer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 971. Because Kronenberger's present conflicts
arise from a concurrent representation of the federation and a handful
of its directors, disqualification is automatic. People ex rel. Dept. of
Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1145 ( l999)
("Ulf an attorney . . . simultaneously represents clients who have
conflicting interests . . . disqualification follows automatically,
regardless of whether the simultaneous representations have anything in
common or present any risk that confidences obtained in one matter would
be used in the other"). If Kronenberger is replaced by counsel cognizant
of his or her responsibilities to the federation and its governing Board
of Delegates, as opposed to a handful of individuals who've
misappropriated the federation's resources for their own ends, that harm
will be largely redressed: at the very least, Polgar can expect her
settlement offers and indemnification requests to reach the proper
bodies. Thus, Polgar has standing to bring this motion. See Wilbur v.
Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) ("To satisfy the requirements
for standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, the
party seeking relief must show: (1) [she] has suffered an injury in fact
that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) the
injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the opposing
party; and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision").18
2. Kronenberger Owed Polgar
Duties of Confidentiality and Loyalty
Plaintiffs further argue that the Court should deny the present motion
because Kronenberger never represented Polgar or Truong, and that Truong
isn't a party to this litigation.1 See Opp. at 4-6. But at least one
Executive Board member disagrees as to the scope of Kronenberger's
representation before the USCF filed this lawsuit. Randy Bauer, a
third-party defendant in this lawsuit, wrote in an email to another USCF
member on August 17, 2008 that "it is important to remember that Mr.
Kronenberger was hired to help us figure out the evidence and the claims
by BOTH sides. He was not hired to 'prosecute' Paul. He reached his
conclusions after analysis of all available evidence." Springman Reply
Decl., Ex. E.
In the context of the investigation for which he was retained,
Kronenberger sent Truong a November 29, 2007 letter (cc'ing Polgar), in
which he represented that the "USCF cannot draw any conclusions until
such time as it has finished its investigation[.]" Kronenberger Decl.,
Ex. A at 1. Yet plaintiffs do not deny that well before the December 7,
2007 deadline Kronenberger had given Truong to respond to his questions,
Kronenberger had already determined to persuade the USCF's insurer not
to extend coverage to Truong or Polgar for the case that Sam Sloan had
filed against them in New York. See Motion at 11. Kronenberger argued
that cancellation of Polgar's and Truong's insurance coverage would
bring financial pressures to bear on them and cause them to hire "lower
quality" counsel. Id Plaintiffs provide no evidence that Kronenberger
disclosed to Polgar or Truong that he'd prejudged the outcome of the
investigation; indeed, the letter on which plaintiffs now rely states
the opposite. Nor do plaintiffs deny that Kronenberger
li fed the information Truong provided him to another USCF member to
interfere in Truong's bankruptcy proceeding, or that Kronenberger
injected Polgar's private child custody dispute into the investigatory
committee's deliberations. See Motion at 12.19 Plaintiffs' argument that
it was Truong, and not Po!gar, who sent information to Kronenberger is
irrelevant. The record shows that Kroneberger was prepared to sabotage
Polgar's interests because of the alleged actions of her husband.
Plaintiffs cannot now claim that Polgar lacks standing to protest that
malfeasance.
B. Kronenberger's Disclosure of
His Conflicts of Interest and Interest in the
Subject Matter of this Litigation Was Inadequate and Untimely
Plaintiffs also oppose the motion on the ground that Kronenberger
obtained effective waivers of all potential conflicts from plaintiffs,
and disclosed his interests in the subject matter of the litigation to
them. See Opp. at 5.20 Notably, plaintiffs fail to identify when they
provided
' such waivers. See id. But the privilege log produced by the USCF in
the related Texas case shows that plaintiffs executed waivers only on
December 19 and 23, 2008, months after they filed this lawsuit. See
Springman Reply Decl., Ex. F.21 This was inadequate, for an attorney
must obtain a waiver for conflicts arising from joint representation at
the outset, if the waiver is to be effective. See Miller v. Alagna, 138
F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 2000). By the time that Kronenberger
sought waivers, both this case and the related Texas lawsuit were well
underway, and the conflicts between the interests of the federation and
a handful of its directors had long ripened. Further, Kronenberger never
disclosed his conflicts or interest in the subject matter of the
litigation to the federation's governing board of delegates. His attempt
to obtain waivers from the same Executive Board members who "ratified"
the present lawsuit was futile, because each of those individuals is an
interested party. As Polgar has already noted, in such a case the
authority to consent to the dual representation of the organization and
its interested directors lies with "an appropriate constituent of the
organization other than the individual or constituent who is to be
represented, or by the shareholder(s) or organization members." Rule
3-600. To allow a handful of third-party and counterclaim defendants in
this case the right to waive the conflicts that Kronenberger's
representation poses for the federation would render 3-600 meaningless.
See Forrest, 58 Cal. App. 4th at 74. Only the delegates could have
provided informed consent, and they did not.
C. The Court Should Not Deny the Motion on the Ground That
Disqualification
Would Be Costly
Plaintiffs' argument that disqualification would be "a significant
financial setback" for the federation is also meritless. As a
preliminary matter, the irony of plaintiffs' position should be obvious,
given that they've attempted to impose financial burdens on Polgar
throughout: plaintiffs' counsel interfered with Polgar's requests for
indemnification in this case, and earlier sought to obtain a strategic
advantage over Polgar and her husband by forcing them to hire
"potentially lower quality (less expensive) counsel." See Motion at
9-11. Polgar doesn't dispute that this litigation has wasted the
federation's resources; that's why a constituent other than a set of
directors who face individual liability should have considered whether
to bring it.
More importantly, Polgar has not delayed in bringing this motion. From
the outset of this litigation, she has sought information regarding the
USCF's consideration of her indemnification requests, purported waivers
of its counsel's conflicts of interest, and authorization of the present
action. See Docket No. 27; Springman Reply Decl., Exs. G-H. After the
Court ordered the federation to produce the records showing "that there
was a vote taken authorizing this particular action," and after
plaintiffs failed to produce such evidence, Polgar moved to disqualify
in a matter of weeks. Because Polgar did not "unreasonably delay[]
bringing this motion for tactical reasons," the prejudice plaintiffs
will suffer is irrelevant. Visa U.S.A., Inc., v. First Data Corp., 1 241
F. Supp.2d 1100, 1106 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citations omitted).
Indeed, Kronenberger's disqualification and replacement by counsel
cognizant of his or her ethical obligations to the Board of Delegates
may help the federation financially. New counsel who does not align with
a set of interested directors may advise the federation on its ability
to recover the funds that those purported fiduciaries have misspent. See
805 ILCS
1 105/103.20 ("All persons who assume to exercise corporate powers
without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally liable for all
debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof").
ILL CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Polgar respectfully requests that the
Court grant her motion to disqualify.
Dated: June 29, 2009 GONZALEZ &
LEIGH, LLP
By: ,/s/ G. Whitney Leigh
G. Whitney Leigh
Attorneys for Defendant SUSAN POLGAR
Brian Lafferty

noauth wrote:
On July 1, 11:59 am, MrVidmar wrote:
(skip unauthorized reproduction of certain documents)
Dated: June 29, 2009
GONZALEZ & LEIGH, LLP
By: /s/ G. Whitney Leigh
G. Whitney Leigh
Attorneys for Defendant SUSAN POLGAR
Brian Lafferty

If any further proof of Lafferty's position as rgcp's craziest poster
was needed, here it is. The delusional net-kook thinks he (a retired
Parking Ticket Clerk) is a member of an ace firm of attorneys, and he
shamelessly appends his name to their name. Bizarre doesn't describe
it.

For the record, the ****wit Lafferty is not associated in any way with
Gonzalez & Leigh, LLP. Any job application he sends G&L will be filed
immediately in the cylindrical storage device - or in the crosscutter.
Or did I mean the woodchipper?

It isn't the first time that the ****wit has done this. It is about
the twentieth. He's appended his name to Karl's Burger-flipping firm
too, which at least is more in Lafferty's league.

Lafferty's cowardly withdrawal from the USCF election won't save him
from the retribution he so richly deserves. His actions have made it
so personal.

)

archived

On Sep 29, 10:26*am, MrVidmar wrote:
noauth wrote:
On July 1, 11:59 am, MrVidmar wrote:
*(skip unauthorized reproduction of certain documents)
Dated: June 29, 2009
GONZALEZ & LEIGH, LLP
By: /s/ G. Whitney Leigh
G. Whitney Leigh
Attorneys for Defendant SUSAN POLGAR
Brian Lafferty

If any further proof of Lafferty's position as rgcp's craziest poster
was needed, here it is. *The delusional net-kook thinks he (a retired
Parking Ticket Clerk) is a member of an ace firm of attorneys, and he
shamelessly appends his name to their name. *Bizarre doesn't describe
it.

For the record, the ****wit Lafferty is not associated in any way with
Gonzalez & Leigh, LLP. *Any job application he sends G&L will be filed
immediately in the cylindrical storage device - or in the crosscutter.
Or did I mean the woodchipper?

It isn't the first time that the ****wit has done this. It is about
the twentieth. He's appended his name to Karl's Burger-flipping firm
too, which at least is more in Lafferty's league.

Lafferty's cowardly withdrawal from the USCF election won't save him
from the retribution he so richly deserves. His actions have made it
so personal.

)

archived- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Charlie is beside himself over this ruling. Kudos to Judge Patel in
showing that there is still justice coming out of some courts.

noauth wrote:
On July 1, 11:59 am, MrVidmar wrote:
(skip unauthorized reproduction of certain documents)
Dated: June 29, 2009
GONZALEZ & LEIGH, LLP
By: /s/ G. Whitney Leigh
G. Whitney Leigh
Attorneys for Defendant SUSAN POLGAR
Brian Lafferty

If any further proof of Lafferty's position as rgcp's craziest poster
was needed, here it is. The delusional net-kook thinks he (a retired
Parking Ticket Clerk) is a member of an ace firm of attorneys, and he
shamelessly appends his name to their name. Bizarre doesn't describe
it.

For the record, the ****wit Lafferty is not associated in any way with
Gonzalez & Leigh, LLP. Any job application he sends G&L will be filed
immediately in the cylindrical storage device - or in the crosscutter.
Or did I mean the woodchipper?

It isn't the first time that the ****wit has done this. It is about
the twentieth. He's appended his name to Karl's Burger-flipping firm
too, which at least is more in Lafferty's league.

Lafferty's cowardly withdrawal from the USCF election won't save him
from the retribution he so richly deserves. His actions have made it
so personal.


And what retribution might that be, Dumbass.

It seems to me that Judge Patel made the correct decision in denying
Polgar's motion to disqualify counsel. Sending the case to Judge
Cummings is something she said for months she was leaning toward doing.
No surprise there. Leigh's feeble attempt to prevent that by
withdrawing his motion to transfer clearly wasn't going to impact a
judge doing what she has the power to do sua sponte.

So Dumbass, what was the point you thought you were making?



)